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ABSTRACT
In 1979, Iran underwent the Islamic Revolution, which radically changed society. The
Iranian Revolution Guard (IRGC) was born from the revolution and has witnessed its role in
society changed over time. Many have said the IRGC has reached the apex of its power and is
one of if not the dominating force in Iranian society. The most recent extension of the IRGC’s
control is in the economic realm. The purpose of this research is to explain the reasoning and
mechanism behind this recent gain in power. The literature review demonstrates flaws by
previous studies of Iran. Most used a singular focus on explaining the IRGC’s influence on Iran’s
economy by only focusing on political or economic aspects. This study will show how
explaining the political economy of Iran best explains the role of the IRGC in Iran.
The research uses event-data analysis to synthesize previous research performed on Iran.
The researcher used various sources to explain the recent rise in the IRGC’s power. Focus was
placed on explaining three aspects of Iran’s political economy, elected institutions, accountable
businesses, and unaccountable businesses. Elected institutions included the majlis (the Iranian
parliament) and the presidency. Accountable businesses included businesses which reported
information to the Iranian central government while unaccountable businesses reported no
information to the Iranian central government. Although presence in all three increased, elected
institutions and accountable businesses witnessed a greater amount of presence than
unaccountable institutions.
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UPF- United Principlist Front
U.S. - United States
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TCI- Telecommunication Company of Iran
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Hypothesis
This research pertains to the growth of power of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp
(IRGC) in the economic realm. The research examines factors which led to the increase of the
IRGC’s power in the economic sphere. The researcher’s hypothesis is the increase in electoral
positions filled by the IRGC’s personnel, increase of ownership of strategic economic sectors
(accountable businesses), and increase of ownership of influential bonyads and black markets
(unaccountable businesses) led to the increase in the IRGC’s economic power. The researcher
hypothesizes the relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable to
be positive. An increase in any of the independent should lead to an increase in the dependent
variable. The actions of the IRGC outside of Iran are not covered in this research. Military,
security, and nuclear policy are deliberately excluded, due to its oversaturation in most research
pertaining to the IRGC. The main focus of this research is to study the growth of the IRGC’s
economic power in terms of political economy.
Two terms need to be explained, accountable businesses and unaccountable businesses.
Accountable businesses refer to businesses which need to extensively report data and
information to the central government. This definition includes normal companies like
petrochemical, communication, and manufacturing companies. Unaccountable businesses refer
to businesses that do not report their operations to the Iranian central government like black
markets and bonyads. It is well known people operating in black markets in any country will not
report any statistics. Bonyads on the other hand are ostensibly charitable foundations which only
report their information to the Supreme Leader, not the central government.
1

Background History
Iran will be an important country in the realm of international affairs in the 21st century.
Iran has witnessed a tumultuous history spanning thousands of years. Cyrus ruled a vast empire
that battled the Greeks. Iran was also the central battleground of the Great Game fought between
England and Russia. The geographical location of Iran has ensured its importance in
international relations for the years to come. Iran is blessed with oil reserves and access to both
the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Iran has also claimed importance in international affairs
for its continued defiance of U.S. policy ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Islamic
Republic of Iran, the country’s name since 1979, is viewed by both the U.S. government and
public to be an enemy of the United States. 1 Iran’s defiance has escalated under the presidency of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, thereby increasing its importance to U.S. policymakers.
Iran presents one of the most pressing challenges encountered by U.S. policymakers. Iran
possesses an alleged nuclear weapons program, supports terrorist groups like Hamas and
Hezbollah, and has constantly threatened Israel, one of the United States of America’s most
steadfast allies. 2 Discerning the motivations behind actions and policies perpetrated by Iran has
proved a difficult task. This task is made increasingly more difficult because of diplomatic
relations having been severed between Iran and the United States of America ever since 1979.
One would be mistaken to view Iran as a political monolith; there are many competing power
centers within the country. They clash and fight for power within Iran’s political system. At this

1

William Polk, Understanding Iran: Everything You Need to Know, From Persia to the Islamic Republic,
From Cyrus to Ahmadinejad, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 10-13, 80, 95
2

Jerrold D. Green, Frederic Wehrey, Charles Wolf, Jr., Understanding Iran, (California: RAND
Corporation, 2009), 37, 88
2

moment in time, the IRGC appears to be the most powerful faction in IRI. This research intends
to dissect a faction in Iranian political system, the IRGC, and explain the recent rise in their
economic power. 3
There are two historical dynamics that need to be explained when discussing the IRGC.
The IRGC’s original mission to defend the revolution became diluted over time. The institutional
development of the IRGC allowed it to assume other goals under the pretense of protecting the
revolution. In the early days of the Islamic Republic, the IRGC’s main duty revolved around
preventing a 1953 style coup. Over time the duty to protect the revolution became broadened to
include keeping Western influence out of the economy of Iran. 4
Also, there are other examples of large military organizations taking part in a county’s
economy. The National Logistics Cell and Frontier Works Organization, two large Pakistani
companies dealing with transportation and infrastructure, are controlled by the Pakistani military.
The Pakistani military also runs various charitable organizations which act similar to business
holding companies. The “foundations” include Fauji Foundation, the Army Welfare Trust,
Shaheen Foundation, and the Bahria Foundation. 5
Literature review
The researcher performed a literature review of the IRGC and their political and
economic action in the IRI. The information spanned from the beginning of the IRI, 1979, to the
3

Frederic Wehrey, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, (California: RAND Corporation, 2009), 2

4

Greg Bruno, "Iran's Revolutionary Guards," Council on Foreign Relations, July 22, 2009,
http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-revolutionary-guards/p14324.
5

Frederic Wehrey, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, (California: RAND Corporation, 2009), 96
3

present. The researcher found many articles written in the early years of the IRI. In 1981,
Carswell wrote an article depicting the effects of sanction on the Iranian economy. The article
described specifically which parts of the Iranian economy were affected and the monetary value
of the disruption in the Iranian economy. 6 Shahrough described the state of the IRI in the midst
of its war with Iraq. The article details political battles between factions, including the IRGC,
and negative aspects of the Iranian economy. The unstable nature of both the economic and
political systems is dually noted. 7
Once the war ended, the period of reconstruction began. In his article, Amirahmadi
chronicled the beginning of the reconstruction process. He noted the need complexity of the
reconstruction process made worse by the huge presence of factions in the IRI. 8 Clawson and
Kupchan illuminate the situation on the ground in the IRI. These foreign policy experts describe
the nature and extent of the economic problems encountered by the IRI. 9 On a different note,
Valibeigi wrote an interesting article detailing banking practices within IRI. He describes the
process of nationalization that allowed the regime to institute Islamic interest-free banking. 10
In 1993, Bakhitari wrote an article extensively detailing the Majlis, parliament of the IRI.
He chronicles the process of dividing up seats and the different factions that interact in Iranian
6

Carswell, Robert, "Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience," Foreign Affairs 60, no. 2 (1981): 247265
7

Shahrough Akhavi, “Institutionalizing the New Order in Iran,” Current History, no. 517 (1987): 53-56

8

Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Economic reconstruction of Iran: Costing the war damage." Third World
Quarterly 12, no. 1 (1990): 26-47

9

Patrick Clawson, and Charles A. Kupchan, "Iran after Khomeini," Orbis 34, no. 2 (1990): 241

10

Mahrdad Valibeigi, “Banking and Credit Rationing Under the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Iranian
Studies 25, no. 3/4 (1992): 51-65
4

politics. 11 Milani also wrote an article detailing practices of the formal institutions of the IRI. His
article focused on the interaction between Velayat-e Faqih (the Supreme Leader) and the
presidency. The relationship between both institutions is strong, while many points of friction
exist.12 Katzman further the study of institutions by examining the IRGC as an institution. He
used Samuel Huntington’s definition and framework for defining institutions. Katzman
concluded that the IRGC has indeed evolved institutionally. 13Amuzegar also described the
economic situation of the IRI. In two separate articles, he researched the effects of sanctions of
the economy of the IRI. In the first article, he notes the different mechanisms that have slowed
down the economy of the IRI. 14
In 1997, the reformist Mahmoud Khatami won the presidency of Iran in an election.
Faruqui wrote an article in 1998 predicting the hardships felt by the Khatami administration. He
noted the multiple center of power inside of the IRI and the resiliency of the conservative
establishment. The tensions found during the beginning of Khatami’s presidency still exist
today. 15 Buchta reviews the multiple center of powers inside of Iran and claims reformers
winning the presidency and parliament still does not give time enough power to enact changes.
Once again the conservative establishment, which includes the IRGC, was strong enough to beat

11

Bahman Bakhtiari, “Parliamentary Elections in Iran.” Iranian Studies 26, no. 3/4 (1993): 372-374

12

Mohsen Milani, “Power Shifts in Revolutionary Iran.” Iranian Studies 26, no. 3/4 (1993): 359-361.

13

Kenneth Katzman, “The Pasdaran: Institutionalization of Revolutionary Armed Force.” Iranian Studies
26 no. 3/4 (1993): 391.

14

Jahangir Amuzegar, "Adjusting to Sanctions," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 3 (1997): 31-41.

15

Munis D, Faruqui “Iran: Renegotiating a ‘Revolutionary’ Identity.” Economic and Political Weekly 33,
no. 31 (1998): 2071-2077.
5

back reforms championed by Khatami. 16 Amuzegar examined the economic policies of the
Khatami presidency. He studied the third five year plan which began to be enacted in March
2000. Amuzegar claimed the third five year plan is too similar to the previous, failed five year
plans. He stresses the need to place radical changes in the plans, along with placing changes
within the Iranian constitution. 17
Alikhani examined nearly the full history of U.S. sanction enacted against Iran. Most
importantly, he describes the Iran Foreign Oil Sanction Act of 1995 and the Iran and Libya
sanction Act. These two acts greatly impeded the flow of international funds into the IRI. It also
could have driven the Iranians to become more self-sufficient. 18 Esfahani, Salehi, and Taheripour
examined the off the books budget of the IRI. The hidden public expenditures of the IRI have
negatively affected their economy, and makes economic prediction and analysis difficult. The
large hidden public budget also makes corruption more likely. 19 Raisdana and Gharavi
researched the black market inside of the IRI. They focused of the opium and heroin market
functioning inside of the IRI. 20 In his work, Molavi describes the deal offered to the people by
the IRI’s mullahs. They offered limited economic openness in exchange for a halt of demand of

16

Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, (Brookings Inst
Press 2000)
17

Jahangir Amuzegar, “Khatami and the Iranian Economy at Mid-Term,” Middle East Journal 53, no. 4
(1999): 534-552
18

Hossein Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a failed policy, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000).

19

Hadi Salehi Esfahani, and Farzad Taheripour, "Hidden Public Expenditures and the Economy of Iran,”
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 4 (2002): 691-718.

20

Raisdana, Fariborz, Nakhjavani Ahmad Gharavi, “The Drug Market in Iran: Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science,” Cross-National Drug Policy 582, (2002): 149-166.
6

political reform. This formula has not always worked and Molavi notes the difficulty of
attempting this formula in a country with the corruption levels of the IRI. 21
Tarock chronicled the freedom of the press enacted by the Khatami presidency. Tarock
claims that Iran has not seen a press as free as Khatami’s press ever since the 1940’s. He also
credits the free press for helping defeat conservative candidates in the 2000 parliamentary
elections. Khamenei, the supreme leader, green-lighted the judiciary’s attack on the free press. 22
Seifzadeh gives an overview of factional politics in the IRI. She identified the three main
factions in Iranian politics, reformist, pragmatist, and fundamentalist. 23 In 2004, Ehsani and
Saghafi declare Khatami’s reform movement dead. They claim the fundamentalist opponents of
Khatami have essentially recaptured the state, but they mention that the IRI is not finished
answering the question of democracy. 24 Alamdari studied the power structure of the IRI and the
evolution of that power structure. He defined the IRI as a rentier state containing many vertical
autonomous power sources. Clientilism is also witnessed inside the IRI because the regime forms
patron client relationship with some of the different vertical autonomous power centers. 25

21

R. Molavi & K.L Gandolfo, “Iranian ambitions: Who rules Iran?” Middle East Quarterly, 17, no. 1
(2010): 61-68.

22

Adam Tarock, “The Muzzling of the Liberal Press in Iran,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4
(2001): 585-602

23

Hossein S. Seifzadeh, “The Landscape of Factional Politics and Its Future in Iran.” Middle East Journal
57, no. 1 (2003): 57-75

24

Morad Saghafi, “The New Landscape of Iranian Politics,” Middle East Report 34, no. 233 (2004),
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer233/new-landscape-iranian-politics
25

Kazem Alamdari, “The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from Populism to
Clientelism, and Militarization of the Government,” Third World Quarterly 26, No. 8 (2005):1285-1301
7

The IRGC grabbed an impressive victory with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as
president of the IRI in the year 2005. Khosrokhavar chronicles the election victory of the IRGC.
He notes the conservatives have a new generation of leaders who manipulated their rhetoric in
order to appeal to more voters. 26 In his work, Kupchan gives some details about the character of
Ahmadinejad’s character. Ahmadinejad used to be a leader of the Abadgaran movement, this
movement believed the elders have lost their revolutionary fervor; they also look back to the
1980’s with reverence. 27 Blanche wrote two articles chronicling the rise in power of the IRGC.
First, Blanche describes the growing power of IRGC military officers. Ahmadinejad appointed
many IRGC offers to government positions. Blanche also discusses the growing economic power
of the IRGC and its participation in halting Khatami’s reforms. 28. In the second article, Blanche
details the appointment of fellow IRGC office Ali Larijani to the head of the Supreme National
Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator. Blanche also mentions an odd fact about the
election of Ahmadinejad; he is the first non-cleric to become president since 1989. 29 Gheissari
and Nasr intended to explain how conservatives won back power in the 2005 elections. They
study the use of formal institutions in halting the reform agenda of Khatami. Council of

26

Farhad Khosrokhavar, “The New Conservatives Take a Turn.” Middle East Report 34, no. 233 (2004):
24-27.
27

Clifford Kupchan, "Iranian beliefs and realities." The National Interest 81, (2005): 106

28

Ed Blanche, "Pasdaran power." Middle East 360, (2005): 22-24.

29

Ed Blanche, "IRGC's power swells in Iran," Jane's Defence Weekly 42, no.37 (2005): 69.
8

Guardians, the judiciary, and the IRGC are credited as institutions that successfully blocked
many of Khatami’s reforms. 30
The IRGC has now become an economic powerhouse in the IRI. The Economist
chronicles a disturbing moment in the IRI’s economic history. The IRGC seized the Imam
Khomeini International Airport after only having one plane land in the airport. Iranian hardliners
were upset at Transportation Minister Ahmad Khorram for allowing Tepe-Akfen-Vie, a Turkish
dominated conglomerate, to build the airport’s first phase. 31 Alfoneh describes the IRGC’s
pervasive influence in the Iranian economy. He notes this makes sanction much more difficult to
enact, because the IRGC diversifies its holdings. 32 Alon also adds the description of the IRGC’s
economic power by claiming the IRGC has indigenously produced an Anti-Tank Guided Missile
that could penetrate U.S. and Israeli tanks. 33 Jane International Defense Review also examined
the new fast attack aircraft and an array of missiles all domestically produced by the IRGC. The
IRGC Navy has also benefitted from the IRGC’s rise in power. The IRGC Navy has constantly
received updated weapons while the Artesh navy has been allowed to deteriorate. 34

30

Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, “The Conservative Consolidation in Iran,” Survival 47, no.2 (2005): 175190.
31

Economist staff, "Could do better," Economist, 375, no.8425 (2005): 43.

32

Ali Alfoneh, "How Intertwined Are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran's Economy?" American
Enterprise Institute, October 2007, http://www.aei.org/outlook/26991

33

Ben-David Alon, "ATGMs can defeat Merkavas, Abrams MBTs, says IRGC chief," Jane's Defence
Weekly 44, no.34 (2007): 5.

34

Jane International Defense Review staff, "Iran unveils new FAC and displays missiles." Jane's
International Defense Review, 43 (2010): 10.
9

This has been one of the IRGC’s strongest areas, producing weapons. Askari, Mohseni,
and Shahrzad examined the economic impact of rising military budgets around the Persian Gulf.
The increase of spending assist the IRGC in creating new domestically produced weapons. 35
Sobhani and Azizmohammadlou examined the factor productivity of large manufacturing in the
IRI. The study found manufacturing of chemicals, basic metals, and machinery performed
strongly the IRI. They found much more weakness in the subsectors of wood, textile, and leather
products. The significance of this study is the IRI is strongest in the manufacturing sectors that
also can produce weaponry. 36
Naji commissioned an extensive study examining the life of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. She
covers Ahmadinejad’s relationship with many powerful people including the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Jannati, and Mesbah-Yazdi, Ahmadinejad’s eventual mentor. 37 Rakel, in his work,
choose to examine the entire political elite of the IRI. She traces the rivalries between factions
and how they affect polices enacted by the IRI. She also focuses on economic policies created by
factional rivalries. 38 Also, Wright edited a book that takes 50 top level briefings of experienced
Iran experts. The articles’ topics range from 1979 revolution to the disputed 2009 election. 39

35

Hossein Askari, Amin Mohseni, and Daneshvar Shahrzad, The Militarization of the Persian Gulf: An
Economic Analysis, (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc., 2009).

36

Hassan Sobhani, and Hamid Azizmohammadlou, "Comparative Analysis of the Factor Productivity in
Iran's Large Manufacturing," Tahghighat-e-Eghtesadi, 43, No.82 (2008): 87-119

37

Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran’s Radical Leader, (California: University of
California Press, 2008), 258-266

38

Eva Patricia Rakel, “Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran: A study on the Iranian Political Elite
from Khomeini to Ahmadinejad,” (Massachusets: Brill Academic Publishers, 2008), 69

39

Robin Wright, “The Challenge of Iran,” Iran Primer, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/challenge-iran
10

Most scholars agree that the IRGC is expanding its economic power in terms of size and
scope. Ghadar studies this recent phenomenon by examining the increase in the IRGC’s
economic power. The author claims a massive shift in economic power has occurred with the
IRGC gaining and traditional business interest losing. The author also credits an increase in
smuggling and illegal activities to the Ahmadinejad presidency. 40 Dehghanpisheh wrote an
article detailing the corruption problem in the economy of the IRI. The author credits the rise in
power of the IRGC with an increase in corrupt practices. 41 Dehghanpisheh wrote another article
focusing on smuggling. He details the IRGC’s role in Iran’s vast smuggling network. He also
credits the IRGC’s ability to break sanctions with an increase in black market activity. 42
Wehrey also examined the evolution of the IRGC. Wehrey’s study focused on the
IRGC’s interaction in the IRI’s political and economic system. 43 Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Iran’s
first president after the 1979 revolution sounded the alarm about the IRGC’s power grab. He
claims the regime’s base of support, the clergy, has been replaced with the IRGC’s “military
financial mafia.” 44 David Thaler attempts illuminate readers about the IRI’s political system. He
traces the formal and informal networks that constitute the regime along with important people

40

Fariborz, Ghadar, “Behind Iran's Crackdown, an Economic Coup,” Current History 108, no. 722
(2009): 424-428.

41

Babak Dehghanpisheh, "Iran’s Dirty Hands," Newsweek 154, no.22, (2009): 10.

42

Babak Dehghanpisheh, "Smugglers for the State," Newsweek 156, no. 3, (2010): 42-43.

43

Frederic M Wehrey, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, (California: RAND Corporation, 2009), 5-6

44

Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, "Iran at the Crossroads," NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2010):
45-49.
11

and personalities who are constantly seen in the IRI’s political system. 45 Safshekan and Sabet
claim the 2009 election brought upon a new factional era led by the IRGC. They illustrate the
IRGC’s overt and covert power grab which has been continuously progressing since 2003. 46
Final Thoughts
As stated before, much research has been performed studying the military, security, and
nuclear policy of the IRGC. This is completely understandable due to the militaristic nature of
the IRGC. The threat of nuclear war usually overshadows research of Iran not pertaining to
military, security, or nuclear policy. Very little research has attempted to examine the
intersection of political and economic power of the IRGC. The rise of the IRGC’s political power
cannot be phenomena studied independently of economic power. The IRGC has gained much
influence in the political economy of Iran. The researcher also limits the scope of the project by
focusing on the IRGC’s role in Iran’s political economy. The IRGC has many foreign interests
and participates greatly in foreign affairs. This research only examines the power of the IRGC in
the domestic political economy. The researcher also attempts to link both political and economic
powers. The IRGC actions in the political sphere along with the business sphere led to an
increase in Iran’s economic power.
The research being conducted employs three sections. The first section examines the rise
of the IRGC’s power in the political sphere. The increase of the IRGC’s political power is clearly
seen by examining IRGC personnel working key functions of the Iran’s government like elected
45

David Thaler, et all, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranina Leadership Dynamics,
(California: RAND Corporation, 2010), 2-3
46

Roozbeh Safshekan and Sabet Farzan, "The Ayatollah's Praetorians: the Islamic revolutionary guard
corps and the 2009 election crisis," The Middle East Journal 64, no.4 (2010): 543.
12

institutions. Many new leaders are former officers of the IRGC or contain some other connection
to the IRGC. The second section chronicles the increase of the IRGC’s economic power by
gaining ownership of accountable businesses. These sectors include manufacturing fields like oil
and gas, construction, and heavy manufacturing, electronics, and communication. Many of the
economic sectors contain companies which produce dual-use technologies. The third section
examines the IRGC’s role in the influential charitable foundations of Iran called bonyads and
also black markets. Both of these areas make up the unaccountable businesses. There is very
little oversight and transparency in the daily operation of Iran’s bonyads. There is even less
oversight of the black markets of Iran. Scholars differ over the specific amount of influence
bonyads wield in the Iranian economy, but scholars agree they employ a great deal of influence
in the Iranian economy. The IRGC contains the necessary ingredients to possess an influential
role in the black market.

13

Chapter 2: Elected Institutions
Era of Reformist
In 1997, Mohammad Khatami won the election to become president of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. This began the brief period of strength for reformist in Iran which lasted from
Khatami’s win in 1997 until Mahmoud Ahmadinejad victory in the presidential election of 2005.
The student reform movement that started around 1997 helped bring Khatami to power.
Reformist movements in college campuses became one of the most important supporters of
Khatami’s run for the office of president. Naturally, Khatami’s call for openness and reform
clashed with the interest and the agenda of the IRGC and other conservative elements of the
ruling establishment. The issue of press freedom proved a crucial battleground between
reformers and their conservative opponents.
The IRGC represented an important faction of the conservative opponents. The press
plays an essential role in the election process. Candidates who wish to spread their message to
the public need the press to allow its message to be spread. Restrictive and unjust describe the
press that existed prior to the Khatami presidency. Khatami created an environment of press
freedom not witnessed by Iranians since the 1940’s. 47 Creating a system of press freedom not
witnessed for at least sixty years changed the political dynamics of Iran. Conservative candidates
in Iran prosper under a restrictive, unfair press system, while reformists crave a press marked by
openness and freedom. The Khatami presidency instituting a freer press gave a huge victory for

47

Adam Tarock, “The Muzzling of the Liberal Press in Iran,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4
(2001): 585-602
14

the reformist and helped set the stage for another reformist victory. Some scholars credit the
incredible free press with reformist victory in the 2000 parliamentary elections.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, viewed the new free press as a threat to his
power and the power of other conservative elements of the regime. Khamenei denounced the
“liberal” press as citadels for the enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran like the U.S. He
claimed the reformist press attempted to sully the Islamic Revolution of Iran. 48 This charge
opened the floodgates to various attacks from the clerical regime. Attacks included the banning
of media outlets like Neshat, Fath, Asr-e Azadegan, Arya, and Aftab-e Emrouz.by the
conservative judiciary. The regime also jailed editors like Mashallah Shamsolvaezin of Neshat,
and journalist like Latif Safari of the same publication. 49 The IRGC did not lead this attack but
this moment is consequential for other reasons. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader has
attempted the near impossible task of managing the different factions fighting each other for
power within the IRI. The increase of power of reformist elements of Iran’s society compelled
Khamenei to create a power relationship that can defeat reformist elements of Iran. Khamenei’s
new coalition included the most hardline elements of both the ruling clerics and the IRGC.
Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati and Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi represent two
hardline figures of the clerical establishment who are avid supporters of an incredibly powerful
IRGC. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati wields considerable power within Iran. Jannati holds the
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powerful position of Secretary of the Guardian Council. 50 After electoral gains of the reformers
in 2000, the Guardian Council led by Jannati used every tool it contained to block reformist
candidates from running for office. An example of the extreme screening process can be seen in
the run-up to the 2009 presidential elections. 475 candidates attempted to run for the presidency,
but only four candidates survived screening. Two of those candidates were former IRGC
commanders. 51
Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, founder of the Haghani School, remains one
of the most powerful people in Iran. Ties between Yazdi and the IRGC become evident once the
relationship between Ahmadinejad and Yazdi are examined. The latter is the spiritual advisor of
the former. 52 As Ahmadinejad’s spiritual advisor, a friend of some of the IRGC and the Basij
rank and file, and a close friend of the Supreme Leader, he wields a great deal of power and
influence. Yazdi espouses an extremely hardline conservative viewpoint that sometimes conflict
with the Supreme Leader, Khamieni. The fatwa launched against Salman Rushdie was
wholeheartedly supported by Yazdi and he gave religious approval to those who were involved
with the assassination and violence of the 1990’s. 53 Yazdi runs the Imam Khomeini Education
and Research Institute and participated in the High Cultural Revolution Council. 54
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Conservatives Ascend
The new alliance between the conservative clerics and the IRGC hardliners allowed the
IRGC elements to win handily in the 2004 parliamentary elections. The Guardian Council led by
Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati disqualified eighty sitting parliamentarians from running for
reelection. They also disqualified 2,500 candidates seeking to run for office. It is not surprising
that most of the disqualified candidates were reformist. The actions by the Guardian Council led
to the Islamic Participation Front, led by Mohammad Reza Khatami, President Khatami’s
younger brother, to boycott the election. Also, 120 reformist parliamentarians decided to protest
the actions of conservative elements like the Guardian Council by not running for reelection. 55
The large number of reformist candidates disqualified allowed the Abadgaran movement to
capture many seats in the 2004 election. Although the Abadgaran part displayed their strengths
most effectively in 2004, their political ascent began in the year 2003.
The Abadgaran movement is a movement of mostly non-cleric hardliners who do not
feel the current leaders of the IRI are sufficiently revolutionary. Most of the non-cleric hardliners
are former IRGC personnel. In 2003 Abadgaran backed candidate’s performed extremely well in
Tehran, winning 14 seats on the Tehran municipal council. The council decided to vote in
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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as mayor later that year. 56 In the 2004 parliamentary elections,
conservative elements won seventy percent of the seats in the first round votes. The second
round vote’s mirrored similar conclusions. 57 Jannati’s Guardian Council took extreme actions to
prevent the reformist candidates from running, which led to a victory for conservative elements.
This action serves as retaliation for the 2000 parliamentary elections. As stated before, reformist
candidates earned a huge victory in that election, with the help of a free press. The conservative
judiciary took away many of the press freedoms instituted by Khatami, thereby weakening the
press. The neutered press gave Jannati much more freedom to disqualify thousands of candidates
seeking to serve in parliament including sitting parliamentarians seeking re-election. The
conservatives achieved another huge victory in the parliament in 2008.
The 2008 parliamentary election resulted in a huge win for conservatives. Although,
conservatives won around 170 seats, conservatives do not signify a monolithic group. Two
camps appear within the conservatives, Ahmadinejad’s hardline United Principlist Front (UPF)
and Qalibaf and Larijani’s more moderate Comprehensive Principlist Front (CPF). UPF won 117
seats while CPF won 96 seats. Reformist held their ground by capturing forty-eight seats despite
having their most prominent members barred from running. 58 Of the 1,700 candidates
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disqualified from running, most were reformist. 59 The election kept the IRI continuing down the
path of greater concentration of power for conservatives which means more power for IRGC
supporters. One interesting note from the parliamentary election is Ali Larijani’s election as
Speaker of the Iranian Parliament.
Like the election of Mohammad Khatami eight years earlier, the election of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad in 2005 shocked the world. Scholars knew little information about Ahmadinejad
and his past. Ahmadinejad presented himself as a pious man of little wealth. His outsider
appearance combined with rhetoric pertaining to social justice made him a different and
dangerous candidate. 60 As a member of the Iranian Revolutionary guard, he served in northern
Iran near the Kurdistan region during the Iran-Iraq war. Ahmadinejad used relationships formed
during the war to help him win the presidency. 61 Veterans of the Iran-Iraq war proved to be his
most ardent supporters. They viewed Ahmadinejad as a formidable challenger to the reformist
agenda. 62 His populist statements echoed a new rhetoric for conservative candidates, now
appealing directly to IRGC members and the lower socio-economic classes in Iran. In the first
round, Ahmadinejad lost to Rafsanjani capturing twenty percent of the vote compared to
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Rafsanjani’s twenty-one percent. 63 Ahmadinejad ran away during the second round, capturing
sixty percent of the vote, decisively defeating Rafsanjani. 64
Many Iranians, including presidential candidates Mehdi Karroubi criticized the IRGC and
the Basij for illegal involvement in the elections. 65 Karroubi complained about the role
Movahhedi Kermani, The Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, pursued during the
election. He told voters to vote for the candidate who lives a simple life and obtains only a small
amount of campaign funds. He subtly instructed voters to vote for Ahmadinejad (Rafsanjani is
one of the wealthiest people in Iran). Karroubi also chastised the leader of the Basij, Mohammad
Hejazi, for his role in the election. Karroubi believed Hejazi placed unauthorized votes in ballot
boxes. Karroubi became so enraged he said, ‘I suggest to Mr. Hejazi that if he wants to get
involved in politics, he should form a political party where he can be its secretary general.” 66
Unfortunately Ahmadinejad used his 2005 election victory to increase his power by strategically
allocating appointments to cabinet agencies.
The IRGC Consolidates its Victory
The victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former IRGC member, in the Iranian presidential
election of 2005 indicated a power shift in the elected institution of the presidency. This new
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landscape would later ease the task of economic takeover by the IRGC. One of the president’s
most powerful tools is the power of appointments. The president of Iran appoints his cabinet
secretaries and eight vice-presidents, pending approval of parliament, and appoints the regional
governors. Ahmadinejad fundamentally changed the political landscape of Iran by appointing
other IRGC members and his friends.
After winning the 2005 election, Ahmadinejad needed to appoint regional governors.
Ahmadinejad decided to discard many of the governors who secured their positions under the
Khatami and Rafsanjani administration. He appointed his friends and allies to the positions once
held by the friends and allies of the reformist Khatami and pragmatic Rafsanjani. 67 Ahmadinejad
used his position as governor of Arabidal to influence the 1997 presidential election by
supporting Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, former speaker of the Majlis. 68 Ahmadinejad decided to
appoint former Guardsmen to the governorships of Kerman, West Azerbaijan, Khuzestan,
Hamadan, and Ilam. Ahmadinejad also appointed veterans of Iran’s prison system into the
governorship of Zanjan, Lorestan, Isfahan, and South Khorasan. These friendly officials who
wield considerable power played a role in the re-election of Ahmadinejad in 2009. 69
Ahmadinejad also increased the presence of the IRGC and his personal supporters in his
cabinet following the 2005 election. These officials possess many of the same qualities and traits.
Some officials like Seyyed-Parviz Fattah, head of the Energy Ministry and Mir-Kazemi, Seyyed
67
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Masoud, Minister of Commerce, worked in the Imam Hossein University. Fattah also worked in
Khatam al Anbia while Masoud served in the Iran-Iraq war. Others like Ali-Akbar Mehrabian,
head of the Ministry of Industries of Mines and Nowzari, Gholam-Hossein, head of the Ministry
of Petroleum served in the Basij. Also, Najjar, Mostafa-Mohammad, head of the powerful
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and Abdol-Reza Mesri, leader of the Ministry
of Social Security and Welfare, headed the IRGC Cooperative Organization. Mohammad
Abbasi, Mohammad-Hossein Saffar-Harandi, and Gholam-Hossein Elham (Ministry of
Cooperatives, Culture and Islamic Guidance, and Justice respectively) also possess experience
with the IRGC. 70
Iran presidential cabinets usually represent the interest of various domestic political
factions, excluding the cabinet of Mehdi Bazargan. The purpose of keeping a diverse cabinet is
to facilitate consensus in policy decisions. Ahmadinejad’s cabinet represents a radical departure
from Iranian political norms. 71 IRGC officials have been represented in various cabinets in Iran’s
history. While there representation is normal, the appointment of nine officials with ties to the
IRGC is unmatched in Iran’s political history. They occupy important post in Ahmadinejad’s
cabinet like the Ministry of Energy, Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, and Petroleum. 72 This
trend accelerated after the 2009 Iranian presidential election.
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2009 marked a watershed year in Iranian politics. The emergence of the Green Movement
created fear and division in the ruling establishment. These divisions lead to a situation of higher
instability within the regime. 73 Sources speculate Mohammad Khatami, an influential leader of
the Green Movement; found himself the target of an assassination attempt a couple of weeks
before the election. 74 The IRGC also placed their target sights on the clerical establishment.
Hossein Taeb, the deputy Intelligence chief of the IRGC, eerily predicated the end of the “first
generation”, most likely meaning clerics, during Iran’s fourth decade. 75 Babak Rahimi, who
teaches Iranian Studies at the University of California—San Diego, stated the IRGC is currently
the dominant political force in Iran. He also questions the theocratic nature of the Iranian state
because of its current military regime. 76
The presence of the IRGC in the cabinet has only increased following Ahmadinejad’s
2009 election victory. Ahmadinejad felt embolden enough to jettison cabinet members who are
not loyal to him. Ahmadinejad dismissed Mohammed Rahmati of the Khatami faction, leader of
the Ministry of Roads and Transportation. He also dismissed Rafsanjani’s representatives in the
cabinet Davoud Danesh-Ja’fari and Mohammed-Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh, Finance minister and
Petroleum minister respectively. He also discarded, Hojjat al-Eslam Mostafa Pour-Mohammedi
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and Hojjat al-Eslam Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ezhehi, powerful ministers of Khamenei’s camp.
Pour-Mohammedi led the Interior Ministry while Gholam-Hossein headed the Intelligence
Ministry. 77
Ahmadinejad furthered the purge of his first cabinet by reinstating officials with ties to
the IRGC and appointing new officials who also possessed ties to the IRGC. Mohammad Abbasi
and Mohammad Hossein returned to their post in the Ministry of Co-operatives and Ministry of
Culture and Islamic Guidance. Ahmadinejad brought in new cabinet secretaries to lead some of
the most powerful agencies in Iran. Majid Namjou was brought in to head the Energy Ministry.
Mohammad Mostafa Najjar, served in Lebanon with IRGC, answered the call to lead the Interior
Ministry. Ahmadinejad also tapped Masoud Mirkazemi, former head of the IRGC’s logistics, to
run the Petroleum Ministry. 78 Najjar traces his connection to the IRGC through service in
Lebanon while Mirkazemi led the logistics division of the IRGC. 7980 Ahmadinejad also tapped
Ahmad Vahdi, wanted by Interpol for the Argentinean Jewish Center Bombing, for the position
of Minister of Armed Forces and Defense Logistics. 81
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IRGC Fractionalization
The electoral victories for the IRGC occur within the framework of Iran’s Islamic
Republic. The American congressional system and European parliamentary systems have
allowed the evolution of political parties. Iran’s system of contradictory institutions, elected and
unelected, has stymied the evolution of political parties. Although Iran contains many political
parties their actions remain insignificant. The Article 10 commission holds the responsibility for
issuing permits for political parties. Deputy Interior Minister Mohammad Javad Haq-Shenas
served as secretary of the body. While he performed his duty he noted, “The system, as a whole,
is not conducive to political parties.” 82 In a system with these characteristics, personalities
possess the real power, not political parties. It is in this context the IRGC developed which leads
to many personalities gaining power.
Three personalities besides Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stand out within the IRGC for their
personal political power. These people include, Mohsen Rezai, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and
Ali Larijani. Interestingly, each person ran for president in the 2005 presidential election.
Mohsen Rezai, one of the founders of the IRGC and former central commander, currently serves
as the Secretary of the Expediency Council. Many classify Rezai as the most moderate IRGC
member who advocates for limited rapprochement with the U.S. Negative evaluation of
Ahmadinejad’s policies showcased on his website led to its closure b the government in 2007.
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, former commander of the IRGC Air Force and mayor of Tehran, also
received the classification as a pragmatic moderate. Qalibaf previously called for implementing
reforms similar to the ones established by Iran’s first shah, Reza Khan but with an Islamist twist.
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Although Rezai and Qalibaf both command centers of gravity in Iran’s political system, Ali
Larijani eclipses their power. 83
Many describe Ali Larijani as Ahmadinejad’s main rival within the IRGC. Ali Larijani
previously headed the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and served as Iran’s nuclear
negotiator. Larijani resigned from the SNSC in 2007 because of disagreements with
Ahmadinejad. The two men’s relationship can only be described as heated. He currently serves
as Speaker of the Majlis. In his election, the Guardian council, headed by his brother, barred
every candidate except for Ali from running. 84 This exhibition of power reveals the threat posed
to Ahmadinejad by Larijani. Despite hailing from the same faction, IRGC, Ahmadinejad
perceives other IRGC officials as threats. The fractionalization of the IRGC represents a new
stage for this organization.
The Supreme Leader sits atop of the Iranian political structure. He wields almost
unlimited power in Iran and therefore holds the most authority. The usually apolitical Supreme
Leader made the unprecedented decision to support Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2009
presidential election. Khamieni chose to support the IRGC over the Green Movement. 85
Although this pairing seems obvious, the Supreme Leader usually does not actively participate in
politics. This led to a split between Iran’s most powerful people, Khamieni and Rafsanjani.
Rafsanjani orchestrated the political charade which allowed Khamieni to rule as Supreme
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Leader. Rafsanjani also supports Mousavi, the Green Movement’s candidate in the election. 86
Rafsanjani and Khamieni cannot bridge this division. Khamenei’s feud with Rafsanjani is one
factor that pushed the Supreme Leader to formally ally with the IRGC.
In conclusion, the IRGC made huge gains in political power starting from 2004 to the
present. The IRGC now wields substantial control over the parliament and presidency of Iran.
This allowed the IRGC to be a huge player in the privatization process of Iran. In the next
chapter, the IRGC’s dealings in Iran’s accountable businesses are exposed.
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Chapter 3: Accountable Businesses
Evolution of the IRGC’s Economic Power
The ascendency of the IRGC’s economic power began not during the Ahmadinejad
administration, but during the Rafsanjani presidency. Rafsanjani’s pragmatist faction began its
ascendancy during the Rafsanjani presidency whose pragmatist faction had won over the
hardliners in the aftermath of Khomeini’s death. The faction was still weak and they needed to
manage the return of the IRGC from a defeat in battle. Rafsanjani allowed the IRGC to enter the
business arena by giving them startup money in the form of oil revenue to participate in
reconstruction. 87 This allowed the IRGC to gain an extra source of finance to augment the money
it receives from the IRI government as the strain from having to fund separate militaries in
addition to rebuilding the economy would have proved too much. Thus, the IRGC used the oil
revenue and the different exchange rates (they were not unified until the Khatami presidency) to
undercut private enterprise. 88 Khatami entered the presidency after Rafsanjani. He failed to
create a more equitable income distribution in Iranian society, despite granting much more
freedom to average Iranians and the press. 89 The IRGC’s participation in reconstruction and its
relentless challenge to Khatami’s presidency then led to the IRGC’s victories in Iran’s elected
institutions.
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The Iranian economy underwent a tremendous evolutionary process to reach its current
stage. The IRGC began to gain tremendous political power in the 2004 Majlis election, when
many former IRGC officials proceeded to enter the political sphere. 90 Ahmadinejad’s victory in
the 2005 presidential election marked the beginning of the huge, rapid increase of the IRGC’s
economic power. One of the most important economic policies initiated by the Ahmadinejad
presidency is the awarding of no-bid contracts to IRGC affiliated businesses. 91 This practice
damages the private sector more than any of the other abuses by the IRGC and their allies in
elected office. The purpose of initiating a no-bid contract is effectively to shut out any
competition to the government’s favored economic institutions. One of the most favored and
powerful of the IRGC’s economic institutions is GHORB or otherwise known as Khatam-AlAnbia.
Khatam-Al-Anbia
Khatam-Al-Anbia began as two separate headquarters running IRGC businesses in the
beginning of Rafsanjani’s presidency. Moavenat Khodkafaee and Moavenat Bassazi were
established to manage the IRGC’s portfolio of business interests. These interests included
enterprises conducting activities in the “agriculture, industrial, mining, transportation, road
construction, import, and export sectors.” In 1990, the IRGC decided to combine the resources of
both headquarters and establish a single headquarter for their operations. The headquarters now
operates within the existing IRGC structure and became known as Gharargah Sazandegi Khatam
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Alanbia, or Khatam-Al-Anbia, also referred to by their acronym, GHORB. 92 Khatam-Al-Anbia
is the major engineering asset of the IRGC. In the American context, Khatam-Al-Anbia performs
a similar role to the Army Corp of Engineers. 93 IRGC commander Sattar Vafaei stated of the
25,000 people working at Khatam, 10 percent of them are IRGC members, while the rest are
employed as contractors. Khatam-Al-Anbia also operates their own website and disseminates a
publication called the Road and Tunnel Magazine. 94
Khatam-Al-Anbia claims they have been granted over 750 contracts by the Iranian
government. These contracts include areas in construction like highways, water diversion
systems, dams, water supply systems, and oil and gas infrastructure. 95 Khatam-Al-Anbia also
finished 150 projects which involve supervision and technical consulting. IRGC Brigadier
General Abdolreza Abedzadeh stated Khatam-Al-Anbia is currently working on 247 mining and
industrial projects and have successfully finished 1,220 projects since 1990. 96 They also plan to
complete twenty-one new projects focused on the rural area of Iran. Khatam-Al-Anbia also
contracts and sub-contracts the projects it receives to businesses they own, or control. Two of the
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most well known businesses owned by Khatam-Al-Anbia are Sepasad and Hara. Sepasad is
currently working on a lucrative contract to create line seven of the Tehran Metro. 97 Hara current
projects include tunnel construction and excavation projects within the IRI. 98
Khatam-Al-Anbia also works other construction projects including the Tehran-Tabriz
railway of the Tehran Metro, the Karkheh dam, phase 15 and 16 of the South Pars Gas field, and
the 900-km gas pipeline transferring gas between Asaluye to Iranshahr. 99 Khatam-Al-Anbia
received 1.3 billion dollars to build this crucial gas pipeline which is part of the proposed Iran
Pakistan India pipeline. The Iranian Ministry of Oil gave away no-bid contracts to Khatam-AlAnbia to build the pipeline. Khatam also received a no-bid contract totaling 2.09 billion U.S.
dollars to build work on the South Pars Gas Field and a 1.3 billion U.S. dollar contract for the
railway. 100 Various hydroelectric and dam-construction projects in West Azerbaijan, Kordestan,
Kermanshah, Ilam, Lorestan, and Khuzestan are being completed by subsidiaries of Khatam-AlAnbia. 101 Khatam al Anbia also worked with the National Petrochemical Company of Iran and a
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Turkish company called STFA Company to build the Pars Petrochemical Port located in
Asaluye. The project will include 14 docks, breakwaters, and an onshore facility. 102
The IRGC benefitted from changes in Iranian law. Article 44 specifies the makeup of the
Iranian economy. The article specifies 3 sectors (public, private, and cooperative) and the
specific industries that fall into each category. In 2005, Khamieni issued a decree which calls for
shrinking the public sector while enlarging the private and cooperative sector. The parliament
codified this law in 2008. 103 This law allowed the widespread participation of the IRGC in Iran’s
economy. The IRGC heavily benefitted from privatization which this law sanctioned. In April
2009, the IRGC controlled Khatam-Al-Anbia bought a 51 percent share of Sadra. Sadra is an
Iranian company which at first focused on ship building and ship repairs but eventually moved
into the oil and gas market. 104 It is interesting to note that Spain’s Repsol and British-Dutch Shell
decided not to develop phase 13 and 14 of the South Pars oil field. In June 2010, The Iranian
government decided to give it to the Khatam-Ol-Osea consortium for 5 billion dollars. KhatamAl-Anbia and Sadra are both members of the consortium. 105 Also, the IRI has decided to become
self-sufficient in shipbuilding which provides a huge financial boost to companies like Sadra. 106
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The IRGC contains other industrial machines to gain support among the people. The
IRGC involves itself in public works projects through different organizations tied to the Basij.
Iran has a significantly young population, most of whom have no direct recollection of the IranIraq war. These people, most importantly younger members of the IRGC, are sometimes put off
by the IRGC’s vast wealth and involvement in illicit activities. 107 The IRGC uses the public
works projects completed by the Basij as a way to increase its legitimacy. The two objectives of
the Basij involvement in public works programs are preventing any possible uprising and to
implement policies to make the provinces more “secure”. The security versus public works
dilemma can be analyzed by looking at the distinction between views on the rural Basij versus
the urban Basij. The rural Basij spend more of their time and resources completing public work
projects. 108 On the other hand, the urban Basij is associated with rigid enforcement of laws as
they struggled to suppress protest in their assigned areas. 109
While the Basij will work on many public works projects, many projects were begun by
the IRGC. One such project is the previously mentioned the 900-km gas pipeline transferring gas
between Asaluye to Iranshahr. The purpose of the so-called “peace pipeline” is to send natural
gas from the South Pars Gas Field to Pakistan. This project is initiated by the IRGC, but many of
the people working on the project are from the Basij. The IRGC also attempts to recruit locals of
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the provinces to help complete the projects. The most talented of these young rural populations
are then offered positions with the IRGC or the Basij. In 2007, Colonel Dehzam Khoy, leader of
the Ardabil Construction Basij, claims the Basij witnessed a 50 percent increase in recruits from
2006 to 2007. The 50% increases provide the Basij with 8,500 new recruits in the year 2007. 110
The construction Basij, created in 2000, serves as a great tool for the regime, but more
specifically the IRGC. The construction Basij is mainly located in the rural provinces which
consist of ethnic minorities. These provinces include Ardabil, Sistan-Baluchistan, Zanjan, and
East Azerbaijan. In 2001, The Supreme Leader called for the formation of the Cultural and
Constructive Movement of the construction Basij, known as the Herat Plan. This plan contains
two main goals, fostering the development of economically deprived rural areas and the
indoctrination of young people into the IRGC-Basij line of thinking. Since 2001, sources from
the Basij have claimed a high number of projects completed. In August and September of 2006,
Basij sources claim to have completed 1,800 projects in rural areas of Iran, building units of
small manufacturing and training. The construction Basij has a wide diversity of projects
completed and slated. They are committed to refurbishing 202 schools in the province of Zanjan
along with a wide amount of recreational facilities. The Basij refurbish schools in partnership
with the Ministry of Education. They also form partnerships with relief organizations like the
Endowment and Relief Organization in Ardabil. They donated 50 million rials (5,400 U.S.
dollars) and 100 million rials (11,000 U.S. dollars) to help build an Islamic school and a potable
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water pipeline, respectively. 111 While being awarded contracts helps the IRGC attain economic
power, the process of privatization also contributes greatly to the increase of power for the
IRGC.
Mehr Finance and Credit Institution
In 2001, the Iran Privatization Organization (IPO) became an official appendage of the
IRI government. Mohammad Khatami’s third five year development plan called for the creation
of the organization and the fourth five year plan codified the need of such an organization. 112 In
the first half of the Iranian calendar year the IRI will privatize 20 power plants by September
2010. Two of the power plants, Khalij-e-Fars and Sahand, contain an estimated value of 1 billion
U.S. dollars. 113 Two automobile manufacturing companies, Khodro and Saipa, along with large
data insurance companies are also scheduled to be privatized in 2010. 114 Many of these
privatized companies end up being owned by IRGC aligned institutions. The Mehr Finance and
Credit Institute has been one of the most active IRGC aligned entities to take advantage of the
privatization process.
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The IRGC took over the Angouran Zinc Mine in August 2009. The IRGC accomplished
this by using the sanctioned financial institute known as the Mehr Finance and Credit
Institution. 115 The Mehr Finance and Credit Institution heavily linked to the IRGC, own the
Mehr-e-Eghtesad-e Iranian Investment Company which subsequently owns a subsidiary known
as Iran Zinc Mines Development Company. This company bought the Angouran Zinc mines for
1.86 trillion rials, around 186 million U.S. dollars. The real value of the zinc mines is estimated
to be 10.55 trillion rials or 1 billion U.S. dollars. Many figures within the IRI regime criticized
this blatantly corrupt deal. The leader of the Friday prayers in Zanjan and representative of
Khamieni in Zanjan, Hojjat al-Eslam Mohammad-Taghi Vaezi, exclaimed, “It would have been
better if the government had given the mine away for free!” Jamshid Ansari and Reza Abdollahi,
both parliamentarians while the latter is the chairman of the Plan and Budget Committee,
verbally chastised Ali-Akbar Mehrabian, Minister of Industry and Mines, while calling for an
investigation into the zinc mine giveaway to the IRGC. The investigation by the Supreme Audit
Court found very unusual facts regarding the sale of the zinc mine. All three companies bidding
for the mines were claimed to be of “the same family”. The three companies that were bidding
on the mines were the Zinc Production Company, Pasargad Company, and the Iran Zinc Mines
Development Company. What makes the bidding process unfair is that the Iran Zinc Mine
Development Company owns 100 percent of the Zinc Production Company and 70 percent of the
Pasargad Company. Also, the same handwriting signed for all three companies. Luckily for Iran,
the courts declared the sale invalid. Unfortunately, this case is an outlier in the process of
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privatization for Iran. The IRGC and its affiliates are usually successful in their business
dealings. 116
Besides funding public work projects and taking part in large scale industrial projects, the
IRGC has entered into even more strategically crucial areas of the economy. The Zinc Mine case
stands out as an anomaly, the IRGC have found great success in the privatization process. In
September on 2009, the IRGC affiliated Tose’eh-ye E’temad-e Mobin Trust Consortium spent
around 8 billion U.S. dollars to purchase 51 percent of the recently privatized
Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI). 117 The only private sector competitor, Pishgaman-e
Kavir-e Yazd Cooperative, was disqualified from participating in the bidding process because of
“security reasons”. The company received the notice a couple of hours before the trade took
place. 118 TCI lasted only 30 minutes on the Tehran Stock Exchange before the deal went
through. This incredibly small amount of time, suggest foul play among Iranian officials. Many
figures criticize the practice of privatization in the IRI. Muhammad Nahavandian, head of the
Iranian Chamber of Commerce claims only 25 percent of privatized assets have been sufficiently
privatized to the “real private sector.” Many IRI officials referred to the privatization process as
vagozari, which is defined as transfer. 119
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The interesting aspect regarding this purchase is the hoops jumped through by IRGC
affiliated financial institutions to affect the purchase positively for the IRGC. The Mehr Finance
and Credit Institute own the Mehr-e-Eghtesad-e Iranian Investment Company. Mehr-e-Eghtesad
was understandably forbidden from taking part the privatization process of TCI. Despite this ban
they still participated by loaning the Mobin Trust Consortium a great amount of money which
allowed them to make this steep purchase. It is also instructive to note the companies that make
up the affiliated Tose’eh-ye E’temad-e Mobin Trust Consortium. Tose’eh-ye E’temad
Investment Company, Shahriar-e Mahestan Investment Company, and Mobin Iran Electronics
Development Company formed this consortium. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation controls the
Tose’eh-ye E’temad Investment Company and the Shahriar-e Mahestan Investment Company. 120
The purchase of TCI represents the largest financial purchase in the history of the Tehran
Stock Exchange. Other important figures besides Muhammad Nahavandian suspected foul play
in the TCI privatization process. Eliyas Naderan, a Majlis representative and former IRGC
member, told the Alef news agency that Majlis will investigate the deal. Interestingly, after the
parliament signaled they might investigate the deal, the executive general of the Tose’eh-ye
E’temad-e Mobin Trust Consortium and his wife mysteriously died in their home. High level of
censorship will only increase as the IRGC affiliated companies now own a majority of the largest
telecommunication firm in Iran. 121 The IRGC had their sights set on telecommunications for a
long time. In 2002, a Turkish telecommunications company named Turkcell attempted to enter
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the Iranian telecommunications market. Turkcell is traded on the New York Stock Exchange and
is the largest Turkish Company traded on that exchange. The IRI government placed the deal in
abeyance once the IRGC protest the deal. The Iran Electronic Industries and the Foundation of
the Oppressed, both IRGC operated entities, placed numerous roadblocks in the form of legal
obstacles to end Turkcell’s attempt to be the second mobile phone provider in Iran. 122
The IRGC will also force itself onto companies they want to own. In early 2010, the
IRGC through its affiliate, Mehr Finance and Credit Institution, proceeded to enter the tractor
manufacturing industry. The Mehr Finance and Credit Institution took control of the Tabriz
Tractor Manufacturing Company. They paid around 17 million U.S. dollars for the company,
rejecting the fierce opposition given to the buyout by the Tabriz Tractor Manufacturing
Company’s managers and Majlis legislators representing East Azerbaijan. The Mehr Institution
requested the resignation of the company’s president among other changes in management. A.
Hanafi, a former IRGC official, is currently president of the Tabriz Tractor Manufacturing
Company, after being appointed to the position.123
The IRGC also controls the Kurdistan Tractor Manufacturing Company. This process
started in early 2010, but company managers delayed the buyout because of their hard push back
against the deal. The governor of the Kurdistan Province even traveled to Tehran to speak with
figures who could affect the deal. Despite talking to various ministers of the government and
people within the president’s cabinet, he convinced no one of the dangers of the buyout. In June
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of 2010 the Mehr Finance and Credit Institution successfully bought out the Kurdistan Company
and insisted the president resign from office. Davood Amrahnejad, an IRGC general, was
appointed president of the company. Western Iran contains no other big manufacturing
enterprises except for the Kurdistan Company which employs 160 people. 124
Sanctions
The main response from western nations to punish the deviant behavior of the IRGC
takes the form of imposing sanctions on people and companies affiliated to the IRGC. The theory
behind this strategy is to place a hard burden on the IRGC affiliated companies to attract
investments and funds necessary to undertake large projects. One of the best cases to look at the
effects of recent sanctions is to look at the development of the South Pars natural gas field. The
South Pars natural gas fields contain about 450 Tcf of natural gas reserves, which roughly
corresponds to 47 percent of Iran’s reserves of natural gas. 125 This also represents 8 percent of
the world’s total natural gas reserve. 126 This represents arguably the most important economic
structure in the Iranian economy.
Prior to Western countries enacting sanctions, many Western companies, including oil
and gas, cultivated extensive ties inside Iran. Total, a major French oil and gas company, won the
ability to participate in the development of the South Pars natural gas field. Total assumed the
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position of the leading company in a consortium that included Petropars and Gazprom to develop
phase two and three of the natural gas field which cost around 2 billion U.S. dollars. Total was
also the leading foreign energy company developing phase 11 of the natural gas field after
Petronas pulled out of the project. Total also participates in extensive sales of natural gas to
Iran. 127 In 2008, Total announced they were halting participating in its 10 billion U.S. dollar
investment in the South Pars natural gas field. Total succumbed to the political pressures placed
upon it by the French and American government to halt its role in the project. 128 In June 2009,
the Iranian government decided to formally end Total’s role in developing phase 11 of the
natural gas field by signing a 4.7 billion dollar deal with the Chinese National Petroleum
Corporation. 129 On June 28, 2010, just days before U.S. President Barak Obama signed new
sanctions against Iran; Total announced they were refusing to sell any more gas to Iran. 130
Sanctions placed upon Iran had a major impact in affecting a western company working in Iran.
The sanctions also had an effect on the Italian oil and gas company, Eni, working in the
Darkhovin oil field. Once all of the phases are complete, the oil field is expected to produce
260,000 barrels of oil per day. Eni signed a 550 million dollars deal to develop the Darkhovin oil
field in 2001. In 2009, The NIOC signed a 1.5 billion U.S. dollar deal with Eni to develop phase
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3 of the Darkhovin oil field. Eni is also participating in developing the first two phases of the oil
field. 131 In April of 2010, facing the intense pressures of U.S. sanctions, Eni decided to halt all
production of the oil field and hand it off to various IRI companies. The sanctions convinced
Italian president Silvio Berlusconi to convince Eni to halt production. 132 Netherland’s Royal
Dutch Shell and Spain’s Repsol has also been affected by the new sanctions. The two companies
were negotiating with the Iranian government to develop phase 13 and 14 of the South Pars
natural gas field. After negotiations were finished, the Iranian government gave the two
companies a week to decide if they wanted to participate. Amid pressure from the U.S., the two
companies gave no answer to the Iranian government. The development was then handed to the
Khatam-Ol-Osea consortium for 5 billion dollars. The consortium contains Khatam-Al-Anbia,
the main engineering arm of the IRGC. 133
The IRGC increased their control over accountable businesses during the same period as
the IRGC’s political ascendency, 2004 to the present. As stated in the chapter, the
reinterpretation of Article 44 gave the IRGC the opening to control the privatization process. The
IRGC’s control of the economy is easily represented by viewing Khatam-Al-Anbia and the Mehr
Finance and Credit Institution. The next chapter involving the unaccountable businesses becomes
much harder to explain.
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Chapter 4: Unaccountable Businesses
The IRGC gained more representation in the IRI’s pseudo-democratic system by
controlling two of the three elected institutions, the Majlis and the presidency. The IRGC
affiliated companies also gain power through the process of privatization similar to the
privatization process of the former Soviet Union. The bonyads represent an interesting study in
not only the power increase of the IRGC, but the decline of previously powerful factions. The
IRGC also increased its involvement in Iran’s black market. Both black markets and bonyads are
referred in this paper as unaccountable businesses.
History of Bonyads
Bonyads were created after the 1979 revolution. Before the revolution the ulama, high
clerics, created and owned awqaf, or charitable foundations. These foundations, like the present
day bonyads, were exempt from state oversight. The main duties of the ulama were to create
ejtehad, or religious interpretation of the Quran, and to provide guardianship for the socially
weaker members of society. The ulama are given the task of safeguarding the deposits and
estates of minors and protecting orphans. People who believe in Shiism are encouraged to give a
tax called zakat which translates into a poor tax and khoms which translates into the fifth. These
taxes serve the purpose of helping the ulama help the poor. Taqlid, emulation of another in the
matter of law, serves as the framework for paying the taxes. It is the duty of the moqalled, which
roughly translates to someone who emulates, to pay these religious taxes. Taqlid also serves as
the foundation of the clerical hierarchal regime of the IRI. 134 It is the duty of the moqalled, the
citizens, to emulate the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamieni.
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In 1979, the Islamic revolution replaced the government of the Shah with a government
ruled by the ulama. This changed the tax collection process for the ulama. The clerical
government chooses not to administer awqaf or collect religious taxes. The clerics collected only
taxes for the purpose of running the government. The clerical government distinguished the taxes
paid to the Islamic government versus the religious taxes. Ayatollah Ardebili, president of the
Supreme Court from 1981-1989 said, “Those who do not pay their taxes are like those who do
not pay their khoms, their property is illicit.” After the revolution, the properties of the shah and
the royal families were confiscated by the government and given to the newly created parallel
governmental institutions called bonyads. Ayatollah Khomeini allowed the Revolutionary
Councils to confiscate the property and pass it off to these newly created non-state or quasi-state
institutions because of ghanimat. Ghanimat translates to spoils, and the possessions of the shah
and the royal family were considered to be spoils. Khomeini directly told the Revolutionary
Councils that spoils must be kept separately from state assets.
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family. One example of this is the creation of the Bonyad-e Astan-e Qods-e Razavi. This
organization added bonyad to their name following the Islamic revolution. The bonyad was
based on the shrine of the Imam Reza at Mashad and had an annual budget of 2 billion dollars.
The large amount of money controlled by the bonyad allows it to act outside the normal
governmental institutions. This situation leads one to question the Iranian government
commitment to private property, which frightened the bazaars. 136
The bonyads represent incredible economic and cultural power within Iran. The legal
system assist the bonyads in their economic dominance by allowing bonyads to not pay any
taxes, to give them easy access to finance, and by allowing them to use exchange rates lower
than the official exchange rate of Iran. The bonyads also report directly to the Supreme Leader,
bypassing any scrutiny from the parliament, presidency, or any other governmental institution
inside of Iran. The bonyads also provide their own administrative bodies and financial resources.
The bonyad’s autonomy has led it to clash with the governmental institutions of Iran. President
Rafsanjani attempted to change the orientation of Iran’s foreign policy. Rafsanjani wanted to
bring a less harsh foreign policy to Iran to help increase trade, The Bonyad-e Panzadeh-e
Khordad, the 15th Khordad Foundation, decided to increase the reward they would give to
anyone who assassinates Salman Rushdie. Rafsanjani declared the bonyad actions legitimate
because of its status as a private charity. 137 This claim is odd because a private charity is still
subjected to governmental oversight. Bonyads are autonomous organization that acts outside the
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purview of the state. This bonyad took an action contrary to the wishes of the president without
any consequences.
Despite the bonyads autonomous status and its limited accountability, only to the
Supreme Leader, the bonyads played a major function during the beginning years of the Islamic
Republic. At first, the new regime did not trust the governmental and the bureaucratic
mechanisms of the old regime and felt they needed mechanisms dedicated to the new regime.
The bonyads represented a huge mechanism that can be employed by the regime to solidify its
new position in society. One example of the help the bonyads offered to the new regime came
during the university purges. Many white-collar professionals, students, and teachers left Iran,
were jailed, or killed. These people were replaced by those in the lower classes who ardently
supported the regime. The number of university instructor drastically fell from 16,000 in 197879 to 9,000 in 1981-82. Also around 10,000 students and teachers who were members of groups
opposed to the regime were executed in 1981, and more the 80,000 professionals, intellectuals,
and people with managerial skills fled the country. The new regime took advantage of the
situation and bypassed a quota system to allow the many university positions to be filled by
people with less knowledge, but who ardently supported the regime. The regime also encouraged
public employees to give preferential treatment to those people affiliated with particular
bonyads.
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control over the distribution of human capital, by funneling regime supports into higher
education and the public sector. The resources of the bonyads helped the Iranian government
expand its access and reach within Iranian society. In 1976 one-third of the urban workforce
worked in the public sector, that number increased to one-half by 1986. In addition to funneling
their lower class supporters into higher education and the public sector, the bonyads also took
part in many cultural activities which helped solidify its position in Iran. The bonyads created
schools, published books and magazines, sponsored art festivals, book exhibits, and museums.
All of the cultural activities undertaken by the bonyads promoted a version of radical Islam
dedicated to helping the downtrodden. 139
IRGC involvement in Bonyads
The IRGC has gotten into the business of running bonyads. Mohsen Rafiqdust, the first
minister of the Revolutionary Guards, previously headed the Foundation of the Oppressed and
Disabled (Bonyad Mostazafin va Janbazan). Rafiqdust was also one of the founding members of
the IRGC and the head of Khomeini’s security when he returned to Iran. 140 Mohammad
Forouzandeh, chief of staff of the IRGC in the late 1980’s and former Defense Minister, heads
the Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled. Many scholars paint Mostazafin as Iran’s most
powerful bonyad. 141 This bonyad took over many of the Shah’s assets after the revolution, most
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importantly; it took over the Pahlavi foundation. 142 This bonyad aims to help those who have
suffered during the Iran-Iraq war, veterans, their families, and the general population of poor
citizens. It now owns over 400 companies and experts estimate the bonyad’s total value at 12
billion dollars. The foundation takes part in many economic sectors including; “food and
beverages, chemicals, shipping (Bonyad Shipping Co.), metals, petrochemicals, construction
materials, dams, towers, farming, horticulture, animal husbandry, tourism, transportation, hotels
(including two major hotels in Tehran), commercial services, and financing. It produces the best
selling soft drink in Iran, called Zam Zam.” 143
Mostazafin employs over 200,000 workers and owns over 350 different organizations
resulting in its status as the largest business in Iran next to the National Iranian Oil Company. 144
Mostazafin owns the Agriculture and Food Industries Organization (AFIO) which registers as its
largest subordinate company. The AFIO also owns 115 other operations. Mostazafin also
conducts work outside the Iranian state. The UAE’s Hajar Mountains is currently hosting a
Mostazafin project. The General Mechanic Civil and Housing Organization is currently on
contract to build a 30 million dollar road. 145
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Other bonyads contain links to the IRGC. Some allege Mostazafin assisted the Nur
foundation’s beginnings. 146 The formers leader of Mostazafin, Rafiqdust, currently heads the Nur
Foundation which contains real estate holdings, and “makes an estimated 200 million from
importing pharmaceuticals, sugar, and imports equipment.” 147 Also, Bonyad Shahid, Martyrs
Foundation, employs Hossein Dehghan a former commander of the IRGC Air Force as its leader.
This foundation provides various members of the Basij and relatives of martyrs affordable home
loans. The Martyr Foundation has lent 270 million rials to urban and rural families. They also
participate in projects alongside the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization and
the Iran Electronic Development Company. 148 The Martyrs foundation reportedly retains
activities in the “mining, agriculture, construction, and import-export” sectors. 149
The important aspect of the bonyads that must be remembered is that they and their
predecessors has been a tool used exclusively by the ulama, or clerics. The increase of IRGC
influence within the bonyads represents a huge threat to the clerical regime. Also, the IRGC’s
increase of influence with the Supreme Leader gives it indirect power towards the bonyads
because the bonyads answer only to the Supreme Leader. The bonyads work in social services
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and social mobility is incredibly relevant because the IRGC has its own network of social
mobility. The Basij acts as a vehicle of social mobility for those less well off in society. The
IRGC formally merged the Basij within their formal structure in 2007. The bonyads funneled the
lower class into government jobs. The Basij attempt to accomplish the same task, they both
attempt to assist the lower classes into government positions. This would not be a threat to the
regime, except if the IRGC as an institution is more powerful than the Supreme Leader. The
loyalty of the lower classes that advance socially would not necessarily be to the Supreme
Leader, but to the IRGC.
Iran’s Black Markets
The Iranian government cannot track the funds flowing in and out of the charitable
foundations known as bonyads. While bonyads account for a sizable portion of the
“undocumented” economy, there is another undocumented sector which must be accounted for.
Smuggling goods to trade on the black market occurs within every country including the United
States. The smuggling, black market sector becomes another part of the economy that is easily
penetrated by the IRGC. There are three major rules and regulations in Iran covering smuggling.
They include the 1933 Penal Codes for Smuggling, 1971 Customs Rule, and the 1994
Governmental Discretionary Punishment Rule.
The 1994 Governmental Discretionary Punishment Rule and executive guidelines created
in the year 2000 add to the rules and regulations of smuggling activity. These rules classify
smuggling into two categories based on the values of the goods smuggled. The first category
includes goods smuggled under 10 million rials, 1010, U.S. dollars, and the second category
includes goods smuggled over 10 million rials or 1010 U.S. dollars. Reports claimed 87.9 and
50

86.5 percent of the goods smuggled in 2004 and 2005 fell respectively into the first category.
Petty smuggling, the first category, contains little of the overall value in smuggling. It constitutes
only 16 percent of the total value of smuggled goods in 2004 and 20.5 percent in 2005. 150
The Iranian economy host many features which lead to a pervasive culture of smuggling.
The Iranian economy contains high levels of corruption, many high tariff and non-tariff barriers,
and extremely high prices as compared to competitors. Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index rated the Iranian economy 146 out of 178 countries in terms of corruption. Iran
received a score of only 2.2, a pitifully low score. 151 The World Bank and International Finance
Corporation’s Doing Business study found that the Iranian economy ranked 142 out of 181
countries. The study also measured import cost (U.S. dollar, 20 foot container). In the study, only
the Iraqi economy performed worse. The lowest cost country, Singapore, had an average import
cost of 439 U.S. dollars while the Iranian import cost hovered around 1656 U.S. dollars. The
Iranian economy also performs miserably in the category of wait time, export cost, and
paperwork. 152
Another factor inside the Iranian economy that makes allows for the pervasiveness of
corruption is the highly subsidized consumer oil products. Energy subsidies represent 12 percent
of the GDP of Iran while some who study this subject estimate the percentage to be even higher,
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at 25 percent of GDP. 153 Subsidizing fuel creates an incentive for export smuggling because one
can buy the fuel domestically for a very cheap price and sell it as an export at a much higher
price. It is reported that over 90 percent of the export smuggling taking place within Iran
encompasses the exporting of petroleum products. The petroleum based export smuggling breaks
down as follows, 60.6 percent in gas oil smuggling, 17.6 percent in the smuggling of kerosene,
2.5 percent in gasoline, and 11 percent on other petroleum products. The import smuggling of
Iran contains a much more diverse amount of goods. The major contributors to import smuggling
include machinery at 24 percent, cars at 12 percent, 9.5 percent involve alcohol, 8.5 involve
cloths, and 8 percent involves chemical material. The smaller contributors include accessories at
4.7 percent, gold bar and clutch and tea at 3.1 percent, and cereal at 3 percent. 154
In 2010, the parliament of Iran passed a bill which will end the subsidization of
petroleum products and replace it with direct transfer funds. The newly created Subsidy Reform
Organization will distribute the funds to the poor, injured industries, and the treasury. The
pervasiveness of petroleum based export smuggling makes Ahmadinejad and the parliament’s
decision to eliminate oil subsidies within the next five extremely interesting. 155 The Iranian
government already expects a backlash from ordinary consumers over the increase of energy
prices, but an increase in energy price will also anger those involved in the export smuggling
business. Ahmadinejad is ruffling the feathers of what is an area of the economy influenced by
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the IRGC the smuggling business. The IRGC officials involved in that specific area of
smuggling will not be happy when the price of petroleum begins to increase.
IRGC’s Involvement in Black Markets
Evidence exist which connects the IRGC to the smuggling business. The Islamic
Republic has periodically banned items such as televisions, satellite dishes, and other consumer
products. Despite the fact that many normal household goods are technically banned, they can be
found easily in merchant shops. An Iranian skipper claims, “We can take almost anything to
Iran.” Consumer electronics carry a high demand within the economy of the IRI. He also claimed
if the IRGC stopped his boat and found the illegal contraband, they will not apprehend the illegal
property. The IRGC always ask for a fee, usually around 3,000 to 4,000 dollars, in order for the
guards to make their profit from the illegal trade. 156 One Iranian legislator estimates the size of
the illegal trade within Iran’s economy to be around 12 billion dollars. He also claims that the
size of the smuggling operations proves the involvement of a coordinated effort, the IRGC. 157
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, former IRGC guardsman, currently mayor of Tehran, former
head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Agency, and rival of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have reported on
the extent of the smuggling business in Iran while he was head of the police force. In 2005,
Qalibaf recognized the smuggling of normal consumer goods like cigarettes, tea, automobiles,
household equipment, and computer parts as a huge problem for Iran. Qalibaf estimates the total
value of the goods brought in by the smuggling business to equal around 6 billion dollars. He
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also warns of the uses of illegal ports and jetties, not registered with the IRI government, which
he estimates about 80 percent of smuggled goods, arrive through. Qalibaf attributes the high
tariff rate and other trade barriers to encouraging the smuggling of goods. High tariffs discourage
imports, which then arrive in the IRI as smuggled goods. Qalibaf also criticized Dubai for not
strictly policing the trade that leaves their country. 158 Although Qalibaf has talked frankly about
the problem of smuggling, he won’t implicate any Iranian actor participating in the trade due to
the fear of creating factions and divisions.
The case of smuggling through the Payam Airport provides an interesting case study on
smuggling in Iran. The Iranian government owns the airport and the IRGC manage it. Around
300 tons of goods were transported to the Payam Airport illegally over a two year span. 159 The
defendant who is only known through his initials, A.T., organized four to five flights a day and
up to eight flights on the holidays to transport illicit goods through the airport. Accomplices in
the Customs helped him obtain falsified passports, undervalue the amount of goods being
transported, and operated beyond normal business hours. The Defendant was arrested by the
Intelligence Ministry in 2005. Luckily, for A.T., his financial powers allowed him pay his 1
billion toman, or 1.265 million dollar, fine in less than five minutes. Information and
Communications Technology Minister, Ahmad Motamedi, shot down any idea that government
officials should be implicated in the case. 160
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Although the IRGC increased its participation in running the bonyads, the amount of
control is still less than the IRGC’s control of the other political and economic institutions. For
hundreds of years this important economic institution remained solely in the hands of the clerics.
The IRGC’s encroachment into this sector dilutes some of the cleric’s power in this once
dominated sector. One can only speculate about the IRGC’s involvement in the black market.
Unfortunately, only some involvement can be proven.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Overview
The IRGC has a substantial control of the elected political institutions, allowing it great
freedom in influencing policy. They captured the political institutions as a result of the reform
agenda spearheaded by former president Mohammad Khatami. It also has increased its presence
in the accountable businesses of Iran. The IRGC has used many vehicles to gain a foothold in
business, two of the most powerful being the Mehr Finance and Credit Institution and Khatam al
Anbia. Western sanctions also positively impacted the presence of the IRGC in accountable
businesses. The IRGC slightly increased their presence in the unaccountable businesses of Iran.
The Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled and the Noor Foundations are two huge bonyads
linked to the IRGC. There are only a few reports linking the IRGC to Iran’s black markets.
Themes
The research began with asking a question about the nature of the Iranian economy. The
question pertained to the level of the IRGC’s influence in the economy of Iran. Does the IRGC
control the Iranian economy and is so how much does it control? By examining three variables
related to the Iranian economy a picture can be painted of the IRGC’s influence in the Iranian
economy. The IRGC has used many tools to increase its economic power. Each of the three tools
represents the three independent variables of the research. All three variables have increased,
leading to an increase in the economic power of the IRGC. Each of the three independent
variables contains themes that relates to all of the independent variables. The themes include
leadership, government policy, U.S. foreign policy, and domestic conflicts. Each of the themes
interacts with each independent variable as shown by Table 1.
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Table 2- Overall Themes Applied to Each Independent Variable

IRGC Level of
Leadership
Economic Control

Government
Policy

U.S. Foreign Domestic
Policy
Conflict

Elected
Institutions

Positive

Positive

Positive

Positive

Accountable
Businesses

Positive

Positive

Positive

Positive

Unaccountable
Businesses

Slightly
Positive

Slightly
Positive

Positive

Slightly
Positive

Leadership
Leadership proves vital within each independent variable. Leadership encompasses the
need for politically active groups to place favorable people in important offices. In the Iranian
political system, personalities determine the relative strength of an office. The use of an office
with someone who possesses a “strong” personality can be the difference between the ascension
and defeat of policy. The placement of strong IRGC officials in powerful positions can be the
deciding factor in a political conflict. Placing enough committed supporters in government
positions can win a policy battle before the battle even begins.
On the political side, the speaker of the majlis registers as an important office. This office
is filled by former Guardsman Ali Larijani. As stated in Chapter 2, Ali Larijani is one of the
more powerful people in Iran due to his family. His connections have assisted him in his political
journey which includes not only speaker of the majlis, but also Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator
and head of the Supreme National Security Council. As stated before, the IRGC is not a
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monolithic group with a singular interest. Larijani has clashed with President Ahmadinejad,
another former Guardsman, over government policies and appointments. Although both men
clash at times, they profess similar ideological opinions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Their
rivalry is a rivalry of personality, not ideology. Larijani plays an important role as speaker of the
majlis by giving a powerful platform to conservative ideology which is exposed by the IRGC.
The business variable also contains the leadership theme. Arguably, the most powerful
business entity controlled by the IRGC is Khatam al anbia. AS referred to in Chapter 3, Khatam
has been described as the main engineering arm of the IRGC. General Rostam Ghasemi, former
IRGC commander is the new Petroleum Minister of Iran. He was appointed to the position after
leading the conglomerate Khatam al anbia. The positioning of Ghasemi in Khatam gave the
IRGC personal control of the engineering empire. Larijani supported Ahmadinejad’s
appointment of Ghasemi to the Petroleum Ministry along with 216 out of the 246
parliamentarians present at the vote. 161 This action displays the informal network of the IRGC, as
a major player was easily appointed to a powerful ministry position. Ghasemi received this status
by being the head of Khatam al anbia.
The leadership theme can also be found in the operations of bonyads. Bonyads are on
paper charitable organizations created to help the poor and impoverished. In actuality, they
appear more similar to business holding companies as bonyads now own many businesses.
Bonyads are also completely unaccountable to the government of Iran. They are only
accountable to the Supreme Leader who also appoints the leaders of bonyads. As referred to in
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Chapter 4, The Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled is one of Iran’s most powerful
bonyads. Mohsen Rafiqdust, the first minister to the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq war previously
headed this foundation. He now heads the Noor Foundation. Mohammad Forouzandeh, chief of
staff of the IRGC in the late 1980’s and former Defense Minister, currently leads the Foundation
of the Oppressed and Disabled. This illustrates the vastness of the IRGC informal network and
also highlights the close relationship between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader.
Black markets have not benefited from of leadership. As referred to in Chapter 4,
Qalibaf, former IRGC officer, held the post of head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces at that
time. Qalibaf used his stature to complain about the IRGC’s illegal practices. Fortunately for
IRGC forces involved, No major crackdown of illegal trade resulted from Qalibaf’s complaints.
It appears that the IRGC is not yet willing to abate the constant instances of black market trading.
Government Policy
Consequently, Iranian government policy also affects each of the independent variables.
Placing leaders within powerful positions or cultivating friendships with powerful people is
important, but one must view the resulting policy set by the government to assess the relative
importance of the IRGC. The policy set by government is not created by just one leader which
creates the difference between leadership and government policy. Government policy represents
the endgame of political theater where victory or defeat of a political faction can be observed.
During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, The Guardian Council and Judiciary
launched policies that affected the outcome of the election in the mid 2000’s. Their policy of
attacking the free press of Iran and making it difficult for reformist to run in the election had a
huge effect on the elections. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Council of Guardians disqualified
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2500 candidates from running for parliament. This action reduced the number of reformist
candidates running, giving the IRGC backed candidates an easier road to victory. Also 120
sitting parliamentarians decided not to run because of the government’s policies towards
reformist. The atmosphere created by the policies led the parliamentarians to resign. The actions
created a clear path for the IRGC backed candidates to enter parliament and affect formation of
government policy.
IRGC business interest has also benefitted from favorable government policy. The IRGC
business interest has benefitted from a widespread government push for privatization. This
policy has been pushed not only by the friendly parliament; the Supreme Leader also backed that
policy. Chapter 3 explains the actions which culminated in the law which sanctioned the IRGC’s
privatization. In 2005, the Supreme Leader reinterpreted Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution.
Article 44 refers to the law that codifies the set up of the Iranian economy. The economy is to be
divided into three sectors and each sector contains certain industries. The sectors include the
public, private, and cooperative sectors with the public sector leading the economy. The
reinterpretation of Article 44 called for more privatization. The Supreme Leader’s decree was
codified into law by the parliament. The IRGC has benefitted from this law because their
companies have been buying other companies during this period of privatization. The most
notable example of the trend is the 2009 purchase of TCI by the Mehr Finance and Credit
Institution.
The unaccountable business of bonyads controlled by the IRGC has also received a boost
because of favorable government policy. As referred to in Chapter 4, bonyads report directly to
the Supreme Leader, the elected governments cannot oversee their operations. The Supreme
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Leader also appoints the directors of the bonyads. Bonyads connected to the IRGC like the
Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled, and Noor Foundation manage to serve the IRGC
interest while being appointed by the Supreme Leader. This paints a close relationship of the
Supreme Leader to the IRGC. The IRGC benefits from the relationship because the Supreme
Leader is task with overseeing the bonyads. A friendly relationship equates to more freedom in
running the bonyads.
Government policy may be injuring the IRGC activities within the black market. As
mentioned in Chapter 4, petroleum products have been one of the most lucrative products bought
and sold within the Iranian black market. This persists because of huge subsidies which lowers
the price of fuel for Iranians. Those who are involved in the black market buy the petroleum
product at a low price in Iran and export them for a profit. This situation is coming to an end
because of new laws written by the parliament. In 2010, the parliament wrote a law that will
eliminate the subsidy placed upon Iranian gas products. Eliminating the subsidy will make the
petroleum product export scheme less feasible in the future.
U.S. Foreign Policy
U.S. foreign policy has also produced an effect on the actions of the IRGC. U.S. has not
held an ambassador with Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 162 Since then, Attempts at
rapprochement were made during the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations. 163 The U.S. still
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remained hostile to Iran when Ahmadinejad entered the presidency. The hostility between the
U.S. and Iran has dramatically increased since Ahmadinejad became president. The
confrontational atmosphere between Iran and the U.S. produces an effect within each
independent variable.
Generally speaking, Iranian political thought can be explained by examining the last three
presidents. Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad hold the political positions of reformist,
pragmatist, and conservative, respectively. Both reformist and pragmatic thought include the
betterment of relations between Iran and the U.S. Conservative thought thrives on the current
conflict between the U.S. and Iran. President Ahmadinejad thrives off making confrontational
statements about the U.S. In September 2010, Ahmadinejad’s speech at the U.N. prompted the
U.S. government representatives to walk out of the U.N. General Assembly. He aired his theories
about 9/11 which include U.S. government officials orchestrating the attack to get Middle
Eastern oil and save Israel. These statements are red meat to Ahmadinejad’s core supporters.
Ahmadinejad thrives off the confrontational atmosphere between the U.S. and Iran by making
statements such as this.
U.S. foreign policy has also affected the IRGC controlled businesses. As mentioned in
Chapter 3, the U.S. has launched many rounds of sanctions both unilaterally and multilaterally
with the U.N. The sanctions have the impact of isolating Iran from the world market. If the goal
of the sanction was to isolate Iran economically, then it has succeeded. The exact economic
impact upon Iran is unknown, but the sanctions result in a positive impact for IRGC affiliated
businesses. One of the best examples of IRGC gain from sanctions is the case of the South Pars
Gas Field. Before the enactment of recent sanctions, Total and Shell were both going to
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participate in the development of the gas field. The sanctions have forced the withdrawal of
Western oil companies who are being replaced by Iranian and Asian companies. Sadra, a
company connected the IRGC is developing gas field phases which has seen the withdrawal of
Western companies.
Sanctions may have produced a positive effect for IRGC involvement in the bonyads.
One of the goals of U.S. foreign policy is to promote economic freedom within countries. One
goal of economic freedom is to promote transparency within markets. As mentioned in Chapter
4, one of the noticeable characteristics of bonyads is the lack of transparency in their operations.
The Supreme Leader is the only official in Iran who knows the revenues, profits, etc of bonyads.
Continued isolation of the Iranian economy from the world economy assists the everyday
operations of bonyads. The IRGC’s involvement in the Foundation of the Oppressed and
Disabled would become an arduous task is bonyads were subject to reporting their real business
numbers to the central government.
A similar explanation can be given to the black market operations. Economic isolation
creates economic turmoil within the legal market and provides a huge incentive to seek profit in
the black market. Chapter 4 mentions items usually traded in the black markets. Many of these
items including cars, satellite dishes, and cloths could be purchased legally if Iran opened its
markets to more imports. The Iranian government and the IRGC want to combat Western
influence which is one reason why they prefer an economy more closed to the West.
Domestic Conflict
The theme of domestic conflict lies with the history of each independent variable. The
IRGC entered into the spheres of economic and politics saturated with other actors. In order for
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the IRGC to gain success in each independent variable, the IRGC needed to fight a rival actor.
Each actor fought within each independent variable represents a segment of Iranian society. The
actors include the reformist, bazaars, and the clergy.
Chapter 2 noted the domination of reformist faction in Iranian politics from the period of
1997-2005. President Mohammad Khatami led the reformist faction to victory in 1997 which
signaled the ascent of the reformist faction. The reformist faction professed goals which were
directly against the interest of the IRGC. Some goals included civil liberties, human rights, nonconfrontational foreign policy, and less power for security officials. With the assistance of
conservative organs within Iran’s government, the IRGC defeated the reformist in 2004 and most
recently in the 2009 presidential election. In order for the IRGC to dominate the political sphere,
the reformist needed to lose their power.
The IRGC backed businesses has recently gained power within the Iranian economy.
Before the IRGC became a powerful force in the economy, the bazaars held the economic power.
Bazaars represented more than a place of commerce. Bazaars have a long, rich history in Iran
which includes participation in the Constitutional Revolution of the 1900’s and the Islamic
Revolution of 1979. Although bazaars still possess an important place in Iran’s economic
landscape, their position has decreased. 164 Pervasive uncertainty due to government policy is
injurious to an import-export business. As the bazaars decrease in economic power, the IRGC
filled the vacuum and has benefitted from a weaker bazaar. A wealthier bazaar community could
have challenged the “privatization” conducted by IRGC affiliated businesses.
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The bonyads contain a very important history in Iran. Chapter 4 details the history of
bonyads. They began as charitable foundations which evolved in large business holding
companies after the 1979 revolution. Bonyads and their predecessors has been a tool used
exclusively by the clerics. The increase of IRGC influence within the bonyads represents a huge
threat to the power of the clergy. Major foundations used to be exclusively run by the clergy. The
IRGC have encroached on this power of the clergy. Their involvement in the Noor Foundation
and the Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled represents resources that could have been
controlled by the clerics. The IRGC’s involvement in bonyads takes away resources that were
controlled by the clerics.
Very little information exists on groups involved in Iran’s black market. This portion of
the variable does not contain the theme of domestic conflict. The IRGC is certainly battling
groups for influence in the black markets, but there appears to be no groups organized like the
reformist, bazzaris, or clergy. Overall, much of the black market remains opaque and the IRGC
is just one of many groups participating in this market.
Results
In conclusion, two of the independent variables, elected institutions and accountable
businesses significantly increased, while the other variable unaccountable businesses only
slightly increased. The research confirmed the hypothesis for the first two variables, elected
institutions and accountable businesses, but not necessarily for the third variable, unaccountable
businesses. The research has confirmed the IRGC’s control of Iran’s economy by proving the
IRGC’s extensive control of Iran’s elected institution and accountable businesses while proving
only a slight increase of control in the unaccountable businesses.
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